On September 18, 2026, the Supreme Court of Texas refused to revisit the rule. Justice Kyle Hawkins tallied the security plaintiffs could demand from three affiliated Greystar entities: "$75 million across three debtors." For claims and litigation heads, any large Texas judgment against related defendants now carries the same per-defendant security math.
On September 18, 2026, the Supreme Court of Texas let stand its Greystar rule: a $25 million appeal-security cap per judgment debtor, not per judgment. It denied rehearing in a Dallas crane-collapse case, In re Greystar, No. 24-0293, and issued a statement by Justice Kyle Hawkins. Three Greystar entities had posted one $25 million joint bond. Under the court's reading of the statute, Hawkins wrote, the plaintiffs could "demand each judgment debtor post $25 million," which comes to "$75 million across three debtors." A filing in the Dallas appeal, stamped 4:32 p.m. that same day, raised the prospect that the appeal might end before an opinion. The record does not say why.
The rehearing notice closed the Supreme Court fight over the amount of security needed to suspend enforcement during appeal. It also lifted the stay the court had issued on June 22. The rule had been announced in May. September 18 made the refusal to revisit it part of the record.
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The case began with the death of Kiersten Smith. According to the court's majority opinion, a construction crane collapsed during a storm and struck her apartment building. The jury found approximately $360 million in noneconomic harm. It also awarded $500 million in exemplary damages, which the trial court reduced under statutory caps. The judgment holds the three Greystar entities jointly and severally liable for over $360 million in compensatory damages. That judgment, rather than the jury's larger findings, set the stage for the bond dispute.
The three entities filed their joint bond to suspend execution of the judgment pending appeal. Nearly six months later, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion in County Court at Law No. 2 in Dallas County, arguing that the joint supersedeas bond was insufficient as a matter of law. The trial court ruled that the bond covered only one judgment debtor, according to the majority opinion. Greystar argued that the cap applies collectively to all three entities and sought mandamus relief in the Supreme Court of Texas. Justice J. Brett Busby wrote for five justices that the statutory cap "applies to a bond posted by a debtor." Measured against an uncapped bond, the court calculated, the rule cut the security from more than $400 million to $75 million, $25 million per debtor.
Greystar still won part of its petition. The court held that the trial court abused its discretion by invalidating the joint bond immediately, without giving each entity time to post a sufficient bond. It conditionally granted mandamus in part and directed that the two other entities get a reasonable time to post bonds under the per-debtor cap. The opinion says parties should presumptively receive 20 days to fix a bond found insufficient under the statute. It does not show that the other two entities later posted separate bonds.
The per-debtor arithmetic divides a single judgment into three security obligations for purposes of holding off collection. The entities share compensatory liability under the judgment, yet the court counted each debtor when applying the cap. Without the cap, the opinion says, each would have to post a bond of $360,012,006 plus post-judgment interest for the duration of the appeal, or the three could post one joint bond in that amount. With it, each debtor faces a $25 million ceiling. The result is still three times the joint bond Greystar put up. On the court's reading, a large Texas judgment naming a trucking company, its leasing company, and its parent as separate debtors would let the creditor demand up to $25 million in security from each.
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Justice Rebeca Huddle read the cap differently. In her partial dissent, joined by Justices Bland, Young, and Sullivan, she argued for applying it per bond. "Today's holding drives up the cost of appeals in multi-defendant cases," she wrote. Huddle warned that "the real-world consequences will reverberate most loudly in nuclear-verdict cases, which are increasingly common and can cripple judgment debtors regardless of the likelihood of their success on appeal." Her view lost in the May 22 opinion. The September rehearing denial left Busby's rule standing.
Hawkins joined Busby's majority but used the rehearing stage to address its price. His statement, joined by Young and Sullivan, took up Greystar's rehearing argument that large supersedeas bonds make appeals "much more expensive." A defendant, he wrote, may incur "millions of dollars in bond-related outlays" over "a multi-year appeal." He continued, of appeals generally: "That pressure in turn distorts the settlement dynamic and leads to the resolution of cases not on their merits, but on economic pressure."
He suggested a rules change that would make bond costs taxable against the losing side, as federal courts do. That was a proposal in a statement, not a new rule in the court's judgment. It shows the division was more complicated than a neat lineup of five against four. A justice who agreed on what the statute required still wrote about the economic force of that requirement. The court did not decide what moved the parties in this case.
The other September 18 document came from the Fifth Court of Appeals docket. At 4:32 p.m., appellate counsel Anne Johnson filed a letter saying Greystar and the plaintiffs/appellees "have reached a preliminary agreement to resolve their dispute." Jason Itkin signed "AGREED" as counsel for one plaintiff-appellee. The letter said appropriate motions to dispose of the appeal were anticipated once an agreement was finalized. It gave no terms, amount, or reason. The letter reports a preliminary agreement, not a completed settlement or a dismissed appeal.
Arnold & Itkin, previously seen in the Sentinel's report on a $604 million advisory verdict in Dallas County, appears here through Jason Itkin's agreement to the Dallas letter. The Dallas appeal had been argued and submitted on February 3, 2026, according to the appellate docket. No opinion had issued when the letter arrived. The question in that court is now procedural: whether a motion to dismiss the appeal arrives before the court's next status deadline. Unlike the bond fight in Austin, the Dallas appeal stays open.
On September 23, Justice Gino J. Rossini entered the Fifth Court's order. It directs the parties to file a status update on or before October 16, 2026, if no motion to dismiss the appeal is filed sooner. The Supreme Court's door is closed: rehearing was denied, the stay lifted, and the per-debtor cap now governs the next Texas judgment that names several defendants. The Dallas letter leaves a narrower matter unresolved. By October 16, the Fifth Court is due either a dismissal motion or a report on where that preliminary agreement stands.
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