A former student alleges abuse began three years before the school’s policy took effect. A Maryland federal judge held that the policy’s defense obligation turns on when injury may have occurred, leaving payment of any damages for later.
Philadelphia Indemnity and Oldfields School, a Maryland boarding school, have litigated whether Philadelphia must defend the school in an abuse suit seeking more than $75,000. Former student Jane Doe’s complaint alleges that a teacher began sexually abusing her when she was 14 and that she sought therapy in 2008. On October 15, Senior U.S. District Judge Richard D. Bennett of Maryland’s federal court held that Philadelphia must defend Oldfields because the policy turns on when injury occurs, not when alleged abuse began. The alleged first abuse preceded the policy by about three years. Philadelphia must continue the defense; whether it must pay any damages remains open.
Philadelphia had already been defending Oldfields under a reservation of rights since at least August 2025. In its March 2026 coverage complaint, the insurer asked the court to declare that the policy did not require it to defend or indemnify the school. It argued that the first alleged abuse occurred in 2005, before coverage began on August 1, 2008. It also argued that the teacher had been fired and Doe had graduated before that date. The judge’s October 15 order rejected Philadelphia’s request to end its defense obligation and granted the school’s request for a defense ruling.
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The policy had a clause that appeared to give Philadelphia its answer. When alleged abuse involved more than one act, the policy deemed the conduct to have taken place at the time of the first act. Doe’s complaint placed that first act in spring 2005. Philadelphia argued that the clause put the entire alleged course of conduct outside its August 2008 to August 2009 policy.
Bennett read the coverage grant differently. Its express timing condition applied to “bodily injury” and the policy defined that term to include emotional distress or anguish. For the alleged abusive conduct, the coverage grant specified *where* it had to take place, not when. The judge held that the first-act clause, found in the definition of abusive conduct, could not be imported as an unstated timing exclusion for injury. Bennett described Philadelphia’s argument for an implied timing requirement as legally insufficient.
That reading put Doe’s own allegations to work for the school. Her complaint alleges severe distress by her senior year, worsening mental health during summer 2008, and therapy beginning that year. The judge held that those allegations could place emotional injury within the policy period. His ruling rests on what the complaint alleges. Under the Maryland defense standard he applied, the potential for covered injury was enough. The wording to watch in any abuse form is the one Philadelphia relied on here: a first-act clause that sits in a definition while the timing condition names only the injury.
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Philadelphia pressed a second argument: the teacher was fired in 2007, and Doe graduated before the policy began. The opinion recounts that the teacher moved to South Carolina after leaving the school. Philadelphia, an insurer organized in Pennsylvania, argued that Oldfields could not be responsible for conduct after teacher and student had left.
Bennett separated that liability fight from the defense fight. Doe’s complaint alleges that Oldfields is liable for the teacher’s conduct. Whether the school can ultimately be held responsible belongs in the underlying suit, he wrote. That question could not settle whether Philadelphia had to defend the school against allegations potentially covered by this policy.
The ruling therefore closes the exit Philadelphia sought through its coverage suit. The insurer had reserved its rights while defending Oldfields; its proposed 2005 cutoff would have ended that obligation. Now the defense continues while Doe’s claims proceed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. P&L translation: Philadelphia must continue defending Oldfields in the Baltimore County suit under a policy that began after the teacher was fired and Doe graduated. The court postponed deciding whether Philadelphia must pay damages until the Doe suit is resolved.
At the October 9 hearing, the court ruled from the bench for Oldfields on the duty to defend. After that ruling, Philadelphia agreed that deciding whether it must pay damages would be premature. Bennett’s written opinion and order put that question on hold until the Doe suit is resolved, and either side may give notice within 30 days of that resolution to lift the stay.
Doe seeks more than $75,000 from Oldfields, and her allegations raised the possibility of injury during Philadelphia’s policy year. They secured a defense for the school. They have not proved the teacher’s alleged misconduct, Oldfields’ liability, or Philadelphia’s obligation to pay a judgment. The federal court will wait for the Maryland suit to resolve before revisiting whether Philadelphia must pay damages.
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